Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience
A Phenomenological Account
£30.99
Part of Modern European Philosophy
- Author: Jeanine Grenberg, St Olaf College, Minnesota
- Date Published: July 2015
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107541252
£
30.99
Paperback
Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook
Looking for an inspection copy?
This title is not currently available on inspection
-
In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.
Read more- Argues that Kant's moral theory is grounded in common, non-philosophical experience
- Provides a new, sympathetic reading of Kant's Fact of Reason that does not require an appeal to post-Kantian philosophy
- Defends important moral epistemic roles for both feeling and experience in Kant's moral philosophy
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: July 2015
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781107541252
- length: 314 pages
- dimensions: 229 x 153 x 17 mm
- weight: 0.46kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Introduction: getting Kant's joke: a phenomenological defense of common moral experience
Part I. The Interpretive Framework:
1. Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality
2. Response to immediate objections: experience
3. Response to immediate objections: feeling
Part II. The Groundwork:
4. Kant's Groundwork rejection of the possibility of a reliable experience of categorical obligation
5. The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III
Part III. The Critique of Practical Reason:
6. Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason
7. The gallows man: the new face of attentiveness
8. The Fact of Reason is a forced, phenomenological fact
9. The gallows man's fact is the Fact of Reason
10. Thoughts on the deduction of freedom
11. Objective, synthetic, a priori, practical cognitions
Conclusion.
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×