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Look Inside Sensations

Sensations
A Defense of Type Materialism

Part of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

  • Date Published: January 1991
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521394239

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About the Authors
  • This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.

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    Product details

    • Date Published: January 1991
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521394239
    • length: 264 pages
    • dimensions: 225 x 150 x 22 mm
    • weight: 0.442kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    Part I. Introduction:
    1. Topics and themes
    Part II. The Mind-Body Problem:
    2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory
    3. The failings of functionalism
    4. In defense of type materialism
    Part III. Introspection:
    5. Introspective awareness of sensations
    6. Introspection and the skeptic
    Part IV. Sensory Concepts:
    7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties
    8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment
    Part V. Other Minds:
    9. Knowledge of other minds
    10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space
    Index.

  • Author

    Christopher S. Hill

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