Aristotle's Concept of Mind

In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

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'… specialists on Aristotle's psychology … will find much in his account that is novel and provocative. And given his systematic approach, such readers will benefit from seeing links between different aspects of Aristotle's philosophy - links that Jiménez's interpretation brings to the fore and that deserve more examination than I have been able to give them here. Jiménez's work should spur on further thought about these difficult issues.' Matthew D. Walker, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Product details

• Date Published: January 2020
• format: Paperback
• isbn: 9781316645437
• length: 273 pages

• dimensions: 229 x 151 x 13 mm
• weight: 0.35kg
• availability: Available