Organizing Leviathan
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government
CAD$108.95 (C)
- Authors:
- Carl Dahlström, University of Gothenburg
- Victor Lapuente, University of Gothenburg
- Date Published: July 2017
- availability: Available
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107177598
CAD$
108.95
(C)
Hardback
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Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.
Read more- Proposes a novel institutional theory on why some countries are better governed than others, appealing to those unsatisfied with current institutional theories or unsatisfied with non-institutional, structural or culturalist explanations
- Uses both quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence in a comparative setting
- Avoids sophisticated jargon and formulas, ideal for both students and academics, as well as policymakers and practitioners
Reviews & endorsements
'In this impressive book, Dahlstrom and Lapuente think deeply about the organization of the state and the quality of government. They argue that a productive structuring of the relationship between politicians and civil servants minimizes corruption and inefficiency. They explore this relationship with terrific case examples and data on more than 100 countries around the world. It is a terrific example of research that carefully builds bridges across literatures to provide new insights on big questions.' David E. Lewis, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
See more reviews'Dahlstrom and Lapuente succeed in making the study of public bureaucracy central to future research in comparative politics and political economy. They provide considerable and compelling theoretical and empirical evidence for their claim that merit selection is even more important than rules and regulations in both constraining corruption and in improving policy and practice. Theirs is a significant contribution to understanding the variation in the performance of democratic governments. In this era of increasing anti-government populism, they provide hope that at least democracies will be able to continue to perform at high levels and according to the best scientific evidence available.' Margaret Levi, Stanford University, California
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×Product details
- Date Published: July 2017
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107177598
- length: 270 pages
- dimensions: 235 x 156 x 18 mm
- weight: 0.5kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
1. Why relations between politicians and bureaucrats matter
2. Theory
3. A closed Weberian bureaucracy
4. Corruption
5. Effectiveness
6. Reforms
7. Conclusions.
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