The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
£17.00
Part of Elements in Epistemology
- Author: Bryan Frances, United Arab Emirates University
- Date Published: July 2022
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781009055963
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By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many – although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
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×Product details
- Date Published: July 2022
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781009055963
- length: 75 pages
- dimensions: 228 x 151 x 5 mm
- weight: 0.13kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Our Six Topics
3. How To Analyze A Philosophical Problem: The Sorites
4. Each Disjunct Is Philosophically Counterintuitive
5. A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Sorites
6. How Semantic Complexity Does And Does Not Matter
7. A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Liar
8. A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Problem Of The Many
9. Knockdown Arguments And Philosophical Agreement
10. Metaphysical Bullshit
11. Philosophical Progress And Philosophical Refutations Of Common Sense
12. The Philosophical Significance Of Philosophical Counterintuitiveness
13. The Three Doxastic Responses To The Doxastically Distressing Disjunctions
14. The Inconsistency Response
15. The Confident Response
16. The Cautious Response
References.
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