Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition
- Author: Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh
- Date Published: September 2006
- availability: Available
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521864749
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Presumption is a remarkably versatile and pervasively useful resource. Firmly grounded in the law of evidence from its origins in classical antiquity, it made its way in the days of medieval scholasticism into the theory and practice of disputation and debate. Subsequently, it extended its reach to play an increasingly significant role in the philosophical theory of knowledge. It has thus come to represent a region where lawyers, debaters, and philosophers can all find some common around. In Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition, Nicholas Rescher endeavors to show that the process of presumption plays a role of virtually indispensable utility in matters of rational inquiry and communication. The origins of presumption may lie in law, but its importance is reinforced by its service to the theory of information management and philosophy.
Read more- Was the first systematic treatment on an increasingly important topic
- Ties together manifest cases of cognitive science common to many areas of thought
- Offers a non-standard approach to fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge
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×Product details
- Date Published: September 2006
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521864749
- length: 198 pages
- dimensions: 229 x 152 x 16 mm
- weight: 0.46kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Preface
1. The legal roots of presumption
2. Presumption and burden of proof
3. Cognitive presumptions and truth
4. Validating cognitive presumptions
5. Presumption and inquiry
6. A default reasoning
7. Presumption and trust
8. Presumption and communication
9. Presumption in science and beyond
10. Specificity prioritization and the primacy of the particular
11. Dismissing extremely remote possibilities
Conclusion.
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