Public Choice III

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
Part I. Origins of the State:
2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency
3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution
Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy:
4. The choice of voting rule
5. Majority rule - positive properties
6. Majority rule - normative properties
7. Simple alternatives to majority rule
8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule
9. Exit, voice and disloyalty
Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy:
10. Federalism
11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting
12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting
13. Multiparty systems
14. The paradox of voting
15. Rent seeking
16. Bureaucracy
17. Legislatures and bureaucracies
18. Dictatorship
Part IV. Applications and Testing:
19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance
20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying
21. The size of government
22. Government size and economic performance
Part V. Normative public choice:
23. Social welfare functions
24. The impossibility of a social ordering
25. A just social contract
26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract
27. Liberal rights and social choices
Part VI. What Have We Learned?:
28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

Look Inside

• Marketing Excerpt (159 KB)
• Index (250 KB)
• Copyright Information Page (70 KB)
• Marketing Sample (126 KB)
• Front Matter (195 KB)
• Table of Contents (127 KB)