The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
2nd Edition
£138.00
Part of Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature
- Authors:
- Sushil Bikhchandani, University of California, Los Angeles
- Jack Hirshleifer
- John G. Riley, University of California, Los Angeles
- Date Published: April 2014
- availability: Available
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521834087
£
138.00
Hardback
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There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.
Read more- Comprehensive coverage of the subject matter in clear, accessible language
- No excessive mathematics
- Updated edition includes significant focus on game theory
Reviews & endorsements
'This is a beautifully clear book on the economics of uncertainty and information. The second edition contains a good deal of valuable new material, such as on the production, transmission, acquisition, and aggregation of information.' Eric Maskin, Harvard University, and Nobel Laureate in Economics
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×Product details
- Edition: 2nd Edition
- Date Published: April 2014
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521834087
- length: 508 pages
- dimensions: 235 x 158 x 31 mm
- weight: 0.82kg
- contains: 83 b/w illus.
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I:
1. Elements of decision under uncertainty
2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual
3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum
4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty
Part II:
5. Information and informational decisions
6. Information and markets
7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts
8. Informational asymmetry and contract design
9. Competition and hidden knowledge
10. Market institutions
11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises
12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.
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