Demystifying Legal Reasoning
Part of Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law
- Authors:
- Larry Alexander, University of San Diego School of Law
- Emily Sherwin, Cornell University Law School, New York
- Date Published: June 2008
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521703956
$
36.99
Paperback
Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook
Looking for an inspection copy?
This title is not currently available for inspection. However, if you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an inspection copy. To register your interest please contact [email protected] providing details of the course you are teaching.
-
Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.
Read more- Challenges widespread assumptions about legal reasoning
- The book offers a comprehensive analysis of methods of legal reasoning
- Questions the current thinking about interpretation of legal texts
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: June 2008
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521703956
- length: 264 pages
- dimensions: 228 x 152 x 20 mm
- weight: 0.36kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I. Law and its Function:
1. Moral controversy
Part II. Common Law Reasoning: Deciding Cases When Prior Judicial Decisions Determine the Law:
2. Ordinary reason applied to law: natural reasoning and deduction from rules
3. The mystification of common-law reasoning
4. Common law practice
Part III. Reasoning from Canonical Legal Text:
5. Interpreting statutes and other posited rules
6. Infelicities of the intended meaning of canonical texts and norms constraining interpretation
7. Non-intentionalist interpretation
8. Is constitutional interpretation different? Why it isn't and is
9. All or nothing.Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses
- Philosophy of Law, Rights, and Justice
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×