Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
Part of Elements in Ethics
- Author: Peter A. Graham, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
- Date Published: April 2021
- availability: Not yet published - available from October 2024
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781108706612
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There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances – either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances – all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.
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×Product details
- Date Published: April 2021
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781108706612
- length: 75 pages
- dimensions: 229 x 151 x 5 mm
- weight: 0.12kg
- availability: Not yet published - available from October 2024
Table of Contents
1. Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Ecumenism
2. The Sense-Splitting Reply
3. Against Objectivism
4. Against Subjectivism
5. Objectivism or Ecumenism?
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