Legislative Leviathan
Party Government in the House
2nd Edition
- Authors:
- Gary W. Cox, University of California, San Diego
- Mathew D. McCubbins, University of California, San Diego
- Date Published: March 2007
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521694094
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The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
Read more- Application of cartel theory to the Republican controlled House
- Up-to-date reviews of existing literature
- Features an extensive range of quantitative evidence in support of the agenda control theory
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×Product details
- Edition: 2nd Edition
- Date Published: March 2007
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521694094
- length: 328 pages
- dimensions: 231 x 182 x 20 mm
- weight: 0.44kg
- contains: 36 tables
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I. The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees:
1. Self-selection and the subgovernment thesis
2. The seniority system in Congress
3. Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees
Part II. A Theory of Party Organization:
4. Institutions as solutions to collective dilemmas
5. A theory of legislative parties
Part III. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions:
6. On the decline of party voting in Congress
Part IV. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments:
7. Party loyalty and committee assignments
8. Contingents and parties
Part V. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power:
9. The majority party and the legislative agenda
10. Controlling the legislative agenda.
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