A Theory of Legal Obligation
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- Author: Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
- Date Published: September 2019
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781108682060
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The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
Read more- Questions how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized and defends a comprehensive and original theory of legal obligation
- Critically assesses the most influential theoretical existing models and presents a new, alternative concept of legal obligation
- Explores a unique methodology of inquiry that has not been used in jurisprudence before and is not reducible to any of the traditional methods employed
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×Product details
- Date Published: September 2019
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781108682060
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. The concept of obligation
2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
3. The social-practice account
4. The interpretivist account
5. The conventionalist reason account
6. The exclusionary reason account
7. A revisionary Kantian conception
8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
9. The robust reason account
10. The method of presuppositional interpretation
Conclusion.
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