Free Will
Part of Elements in Philosophy of Mind
- Author: Derk Pereboom, Cornell University, New York
- Date Published: February 2022
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781108990837
Find out more about Cambridge eBooks
Adobe eBook Reader
Other available formats:
Paperback
Looking for an examination copy?
This title is not currently available for examination. However, if you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact [email protected] providing details of the course you are teaching.
-
This Element provides a thorough overview of the free will debate as it currently stands. After distinguishing the main senses of the term 'free will' invoked in that debate, it proceeds to set out the prominent versions of the main positions, libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will skepticism, and then to discuss the main objections to these views. Particular attention is devoted to the controversy concerning whether the ability to do otherwise is required for moral responsibility and whether it is compatible with determinism, and to manipulation arguments against compatibilism. Two areas in which the free will debate has practical implications are discussed in detail, personal relationships and criminal justice.
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: February 2022
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781108990837
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
Table of Contents
1. The Free Will Debate
2. Libertarianism
3. Compatibilism
4. The Ability to Do Otherwise
5. Does Moral Responsibility Require Alternative Possibilities?
6. The Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism
7. Free Will Skepticism
8. Free Will and Personal Relationships
9. Free Will and Crime
10. Final Words.
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×