Moral Disagreement
£30.99
Part of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
- Author: Folke Tersman, Stockholms Universitet
- Date Published: July 2009
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521115551
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Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
Read more- Unique in that it is entirely devoted to moral disagreement and its implications
- Acknowledges the crucial relevance of assumptions about when moral convictions can be correctly attributed to a thinker
- Addresses methodological questions about the content and status of meta-ethical theories
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×Product details
- Date Published: July 2009
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521115551
- length: 160 pages
- dimensions: 229 x 152 x 9 mm
- weight: 0.25kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Preface
1. Realism and irrealism
2. The case for radical moral disagreement
3. Explaining and predicting disagreement
4. The argument from inaccessibility
5. The argument from ambiguity
6. Attributing moral judgments
References
Index.
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