Information, Incentives and the Economics of Control
- Author: G. C. Archibald, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
- Date Published: December 2005
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521022798
Paperback
Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook
Looking for an inspection copy?
Please email [email protected] to enquire about an inspection copy of this book
-
This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed.
Read more- Advanced monograph by a respected theorist looking at how industries can be guided to optimal performance without central planning or reliance on the market
- Archibald is a well-known figure, widely published in the journals
- This an interesting subject, made more topical by the collapse of the command economies in Eastern Europe and the search for other alternatives to pure market forces
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: December 2005
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521022798
- length: 192 pages
- dimensions: 216 x 139 x 13 mm
- weight: 0.255kg
- contains: 6 b/w illus. 1 table
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Preface
Part I. Introductory:
1. Two preliminary matters
2. Extended preferences
Part II. Iterative Controls:
3. Feedback control processes
4. First example: an externality problem
5. Second application of the control process: Lerner's problem
6. Third example of the control process: implementation of a second-best solution
7. Two examples of the control process in a mixed economy
Part III. Non-convexities:
8. Non-convexities in the technology
9. Non-convexity and optimal product choice
Part IV. Cooperatives:
10. Pareto-improvements and cooperatives
11. Achieving pareto-efficiency in the LMF
12. Risk-sharing in Illyria (the ELMF)
Appendix: the taxation of economic rent
Notes
Bibliography
Index.
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×