Money for Votes
The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa
£30.99
- Author: Eric Kramon, George Washington University, Washington DC
- Date Published: March 2020
- availability: Available
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781316645147
£
30.99
Paperback
Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook
Looking for an inspection copy?
This title is not currently available on inspection
-
Politicians distribute money to voters during campaigns in many low-income democracies. Many observers call this practice 'vote buying'. Money for Votes develops an alternative theory of electoral clientelism that emphasizes the role of monetary handouts in conveying information to voters, helping politicians enhance the credibility of their promises to deliver development resources and particularistic benefits to their constituents. Supported by interviews, experiments, and surveys in Kenya, and additional evidence from qualitative and survey data from elsewhere in Africa, the study tests the implications of this argument, and traces the consequences of electoral clientelism for voter behaviour, ethnic politics, public goods provision, and democratic accountability. Ultimately, the book suggests that the relationship of electoral clientelism to the quality of democracy is far more nuanced than our instincts might suggest.
Read more- Examines the role of money in electoral politics, explaining why many politicians hand out money and gifts to voters in low-income democracies
- Presents a new way of thinking about the role of monetary handouts in electoral politics
- Uses multiple research methods, presenting evidence from in-depth interviews, experiments, and surveys in an accessible way
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: March 2020
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9781316645147
- length: 245 pages
- dimensions: 150 x 230 x 15 mm
- weight: 0.38kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I. The Puzzle of Electoral Clientelism:
1. Introduction
2. Electoral clientelism in Kenya
3. Theory: electoral clientelism as information
Part II. Empirical Evidence:
4. The mechanics of electoral clientelism: descriptive evidence
5. Why is electoral clientelism effective? Experimental evidence
6. Who invests in electoral clientelism? Incumbents versus challengers
7. Electoral clientelism and ethnic politics
8. Electoral clientelism and the provision of local public goods
9. Conclusion.
Related Books
related journals
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×