Securities against Misrule
Juries, Assemblies, Elections
£75.00
- Author: Jon Elster, Columbia University and College de France
- Date Published: July 2013
- availability: Available
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107031739
£
75.00
Hardback
Other available formats:
Paperback, eBook
Looking for an inspection copy?
This title is not currently available on inspection
-
Elster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics and law.
Read more- Proposes a novel normative theory of collective decision-making with extensive use of historical material
- Provides readers with a critical analysis of incentive-based institutional design
- An argument for the relevance of Bentham's political theory (not including his utilitarianism)
Reviews & endorsements
'Well-written and engaging …' The Times Literary Supplement
Customer reviews
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity
×Product details
- Date Published: July 2013
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781107031739
- length: 338 pages
- dimensions: 236 x 155 x 25 mm
- weight: 0.64kg
- contains: 6 b/w illus.
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. The normative study of collective decision making
2. Ignorance, secrecy, and publicity in jury decision making
3. A dialogue with Bentham
4. The optimal design of constituent assemblies
5. Cross-voting: a study in failure
6. Conclusion.Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses
- Political Science: Intro. Theories
Related Books
related journals
also by this author
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email [email protected]
Register Sign in» Proceed
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.
Continue ×Are you sure you want to delete your account?
This cannot be undone.
Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.
If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.
×