Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
Ever since the first theories of rational decision making were developed in the seventeenth century, decision theorists have attempted to answer the following question: what should a rational agent do when confronted with a set of alternative actions, given the limited and sometimes unreliable information available to her? Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy provides accessible discussions of central topics in decision and game theory, written by leading experts in the field. The series will help readers of all levels improve their understanding of rational decision-making by clarifying concepts such as risk aversion, coalition formation, imprecise credences, Bayesianism, the Dutch Book argument, causal decision theory, judgment aggregation, fat tails, the independence axiom, and other related issues and debates. Each Element begins with a nontechnical introduction ideal for readers with limited knowledge of the topic and gradually proceeds with more advanced material that will appeal to scholars and researchers.
General Editor: Martin Peterson, Texas A&M University
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